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Policymakers have questioned whether firms should be allowed to indemnify their em-
ployees for personal sanctions for corporate crimes. This paper provides the first formal
analysis of this form of indemnification. Targeting employees with unindemnifiable sanc-
tions carries the social cost of exposing employees of law-abiding firms to the risk of
mistaken government prosecution. Deterrence is typically achieved more efficiently by
sanctioning the firm alone. We find the conditions under which the government should
additionally sanction employees to be quite limited, and the conditions under which the
government should ban indemnification of these sanctions to be more limited still. An
unindemnifiable employee sanction can provide prosecutors with leverage to adjust the
employee’s sanction in exchange for his cooperation against the firm. (JEL K22, D82,
L20)
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1. Introduction
Sanctions may be levied on both a firm and its agents for violations of securities, antitrust,
environmental, bribery, safety, and other laws. The incorporation laws of most U.S. states
allow firms to reimburse agents’ legal costs and losses from settlements, judgments, and
fines. Delaware law grants incorporating firms a broad ability to insure their agents,
either through direct indemnification payments from the firm itself or through third-party
Director and Officer (D&O) insurance (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991), even allowing
corporations to include mandatory indemnification in their corporate charters or bylaws.
According to a recent survey, 98% of U.S. firms with over 500 shareholders had D&O
insurance (Tillinghast-Towers Perrin, 2002).
While coverage under indemnification and D&O insurance is broad, there are ex-
ceptions. State laws forbid indemnification and D&O insurance coverage in the case
of willful criminal misconduct (Harrington and Niehaus, 1998). However, Stone (1980)
argues that such de jure exclusions do not prevent de facto coverage for willful criminal
misconduct. A number of federal crimes require only limited or no proof of intent or
knowledge. State laws specify that conviction for such crimes “shall not, of itself, create
a presumption that the person did not act in good faith” (Stone, 1980:49). Where to
draw the line between indemnifiable and unindemnifiable actions is thus an important
theoretical and public-policy question.
The debate over indemnification has been active. William Donaldson, then Chairman
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of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), indicated: “I’m concerned about
companies that, under permissive state laws, indemnify their officers and directors against
disgorgement and penalties ordered by law enforcement agencies, including those brought
by the Commission. In my mind, this just isn’t good public policy.”1 This statement drew
criticism from former SEC official Stanley Sporkin, reported in the Chicago Sun Times
(June 17, 2003:49): “For the SEC to come out and say you can’t get insurance for these
things, I think they are going pretty far.”
In theory, a benevolent government authority that is a perfect law enforcer should divide
sanctions between the firm and agent in just the right way to obtain optimal deterrence.
Indemnification allows the firm to undo this balance by transforming employee sanctions
into de facto firm sanctions, perhaps impairing deterrence. This argues in favor of a
wholesale ban on indemnification. In practice, however, indemnification is not only legal
but ubiquitous, suggesting it provides some important social benefit.
This paper addresses the apparent contradiction between theory and practice as the first
formal analysis of employee indemnification. The key is departing from the assumption
that the government is a perfect enforcer. The possibility of type-I enforcement errors—
i.e., convicting law-abiding firms with some probability—provides a reason for even law-
abiding firms to indemnify employees. This shifts the risk of sanctions from the high-cost
bearer—the risk-averse agent—to the low-cost bearer—the risk-neutral principal.
It has been postulated (Stone, 1980; Kraakman, 1984; Privileggi, et al., 2001) that ban-
ning indemnification magnifies the frictions in the principal-agent relationship, increasing
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the operating costs of a criminal firm. Our formal analysis confirms this postulate, but
also demonstrates that the apparent policy implication, to ban indemnification, is erro-
neous. In our model, the government authority can always deter crime with a sufficiently
high combination of fines on the firm and employee. The challenge is to deter crime at
minimum social cost. We show that deterrence can typically be obtained at minimum
social cost by sanctioning the firm alone. This maintains deterrence without exposing the
agent to risk from sanctions or inducing the exit of productive, law-abiding firms.
Sanctioning the agent is valuable in limited circumstances. If deterrence is especially
difficult, it may be optimal to hit the agent with a sanction large enough to bankrupt him.
Although the de jure sanctions cannot vary with actual guilt—imperfect enforcement
prevents this—bankrupting the agent allows the de facto agent sanction to vary with his
wealth. The agent needs to be paid a premium to induce him to commit a crime, and so
the agent of the criminal firm ends up having more wealth to be seized than the agent of a
law-abiding firm. Indemnification need not be explicitly banned for this strategy to work:
the agent’s sanction can be set so high that the firm would not choose to indemnify the
agent even if allowed by law.
Indeed, if sanctions are set appropriately, the government’s policy toward indemnifi-
cation becomes moot. Either the agent should not be sanctioned at all, in which case there
is nothing for the firm to indemnify, or the agent should be sanctioned so harshly that the
firm chooses not to indemnify the agent even if it could. The government’s policy toward
indemnification is not moot in an extension of the corporate-crime model in Section 5 in
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which the agent’s cooperation can help convict a criminal firm. The authority can offer
to reduce the employee’s fine in return for his cooperation, an offer the firm can unravel
by pledging to indemnify him fully.
Section 2 sets up the model. We solve for equilibrium using backward induction,
first determining the optimal employment contract taking government policy as given in
Section 3, and then determining the optimal government policy (sanctions and policy
toward indemnification) in Section 4. Section 5 extends the basic model to allow the
employee to cooperate with the prosecution, and provides an analysis of this extended
model. Section 6 contains the literature review, and Section 7 concludes with a discussion
of the implications for recent controversies and directions for future research.
2. Model
The model has three players. Within the firm, there is a principal and an agent. The
principal is the residual claimant of profit who designs the agent’s incentive scheme.
The agent carries out activities within the firm, including the possibility of committing a
criminal act. We call the principal simply the “firm” and the agent simply the “employee.”
The third player is the government, which sets and enforces sanctions against corporate
crime.
The employee chooses action a ∈ {0, 1}, an indicator for whether a crime is committed
(a = 1) or not (a = 0). Let c(a) be his disutility from working in the firm, with c(0) = 0
4
and c(1) = C . Thus C represents his cost of committing the crime, including any physical
effort required plus any psychic costs of violating a personal ethical code. Let r(a) be
the firm’s gross return, with r(0) = R and r(1) = R + X. Thus R represents the firm’s
baseline return and X the extra return from the crime. Let h(a) be the external harm
from the firm’s operations, with h(0) = 0 and h(1) = H. Thus H represents the external
social harm generated by the crime. Assume H > X − C , implying that the first-best
policy is to deter crime. Assume C,R,X,H > 0.
The employee’s wage w(r) can be conditioned on the firm’s gross return. Since the
firm’s gross return r(a) is a deterministic function of the employee’s action, the wage can
effectively be conditioned on the criminal act. We will abuse notation slightly and write
w(a) = w(r(a)).
The government makes type-I and type-II errors in enforcing corporate-crime laws,
modeled as follows. Let g(a) be the probability the government obtains a conviction.
Thus g(0) is the probability the government makes a type-I error, mistakenly convicting
an innocent firm, and 1 − g(1) is the probability the government makes a type-II error,
failing to convict a criminal firm. Assume the probability of conviction is higher if a crime
is committed: g(1) > g(0). Conviction rates are exogenously given.2 For conciseness,
let g0 = g(0) and g1 = g(1).
Conditional on conviction, the government levies sanction sf ≥ 0 against the firm
and se ≥ 0 against the employee. Let s = sf + se be the total sanction. Sanctions are
an endogenous choice for the government. The employment contract may specify that
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the firm indemnifies the employee for losses due to the sanction. Let si ∈ [0, se] be this
indemnification payment, i.e., a payment from the firm to the employee conditional on
conviction.
The firm is risk neutral. The employee is risk averse. Let u : R+ → R+ be the
employee’s utility over wealth, with u(0) = 0, u′ > 0, and u′′ < 0. The cost of crime c
is additively separable from u in the employee’s overall utility function.
To abstract away from firm judgment proofness, we assume the firm has an unlimited
supply of liquifiable assets to pay its obligations. On the other hand, employee limited
liability plays an integral role in one of our later results. To characterize employee limited
liability, we assume the employee has a supply of liquifiable assets e which in addition
to his wage w and indemnification payment si can be used to pay the sanction se. The
employee’s best option outside the firm provides no opportunity for crime, carries no risk
of mistaken conviction, and pays a wage normalized to zero. If he takes this outside
option, he consumes his liquifiable assets e, implying that his reservation utility is u(e).
The timing is as follows. First the government sets the sanctions sf and se. These
are observed by the firm. The firm then sets the employment contract (w(0), w(1), si).
The employee decides to accept the contract or pursue his outside option. Conditional on
signing the contract, the employee then chooses whether or not to commit the crime. The
state of the world determining whether the government convicts is realized, returns are
realized, sanctions assessed, and wage and indemnification payments made.
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3. Equilibrium Employment Contracts
We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibrium by backward induction. In the present
section, we will take the government’s sanction scheme (sf , se) as given, we will solve
for the employment contract (w(0), w(1), si) maximizing the firm’s profit. Following
Grossman and Hart (1983), we will separate the firm’s optimal-contracting problem into
two steps. The first step is to solve for the optimal incentive-compatible and individually-
rational contract implementing arbitrary employee action a. The second step is to compare
the profits from the contract implementing no crime (a = 0) to that implementing crime
(a = 1) and select the one yielding higher profit for the firm.
Consider the design of the optimal contract implementing action a, specifying three
terms: an equilibrium wage w(a), a wage w(a′) if the other action a′ is taken, and an
indemnification payment si. The firm’s objective function is
r(a)− w(a)− g(a)(sf + si), (1)
equal to the firm’s gross return, less the wage payment, less the sanction and indem-
nification payments weighted by the probability the government convicts the firm. The
employee’s expected surplus is
g(a)u(max{0, e + w(a) + si − se}) + [1− g(a)] u(e + w(a))− c(a). (2)
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The employee adds the wage w(a) to his existing wealth e unless the government convicts.
If the government convicts, the employee receives w(a) + si from the firm. He puts this
payment together with its other liquifiable assets e and pays se if it has sufficient funds.
Otherwise it pays as much as it can and ends up with no wealth.
For the contract to be individually rational, the employee’s surplus in equation (2)
must exceed his reservation utility u(e). For the contract to be incentive compatible, (2)
must exceed his surplus from choosing the “wrong” action a′. It turns out we can ignore
the incentive-compatibility constraint. By reducing the wage for the “wrong” action to
the lowest possible level, w(a′) = 0, the firm can ensure the employee’s surplus from
choosing a′ is no greater than u(e)−c(a′), which in turn is no greater than the employee’s
reservation utility u(e). Hence incentive compatibility is implied by individual rationality.
Since the firm is risk neutral and the employee risk averse, the optimal contract in
many cases calls for the firm to insure the agent fully by indemnifying the full amount of
the employee sanction: si = se. The exception arises when se becomes large. Then rather
than indemnifying this large loss, the firm finds it cheaper not to indemnify the employee
at all, accepting the fact that the sanction will bankrupt him, but taking advantage of his
limited liability to cap his loss from the sanction, paying a higher wage to compensate for
this loss. The next proposition fully characterizes the equilibrium contract.
Proposition 1. The profit-maximizing contract for the firm depends on the level of se.
If se is below a threshold, the firm fully indemnifies the employee (si = se). If se is
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above this threshold, the firm offers no indemnification (si = 0), and se bankrupts the
employee. The firm optimally implements the action a maximizing its objective function
(1) given equilibrium wage and indemnification payments.
The proof of Proposition 1 in the appendix provides closed-form solutions for the
threshold on se determining whether the firm indemnifies the employee and for equilibrium
wages.
Proposition 1 shows that the basic insights from the insurance literature apply to in-
demnification. The literature has shown (see for example Proposition 2 of Shavell (1986))
that a risk-averse agent with limited assets will purchase full insurance at actuarially fair
rates if the insured loss is below a threshold and no insurance if the loss is above this
threshold. The same principle applies to the self-insurance within the firm represented by
indemnification.
4. Optimal Sanctions
Throughout the section we will distinguish between the first and second best. The first
best is the outcome the government could achieve if it could directly set the employee
contract and criminal action. The second best is the social-welfare-maximizing outcome
subject to the constraints on the government assumed in the model: the government can
set sanctions, not the employee contract or criminal action directly, and its enforcement
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ability is imperfect, with type-I and II errors. The second best will be the government
sanction scheme observed in equilibrium.
4.1. Alleged Benefit of Employee Sanctions
The literature suggests the following intuition for a possible benefit to the government
of sanctioning the employee and banning his indemnification. Banning indemnification
increases the friction in the contracting process between the firm and employee, and this
friction presumably harms the criminal firm more because the probability of conviction—
and the probability an indemnification payment would have been made if it were allowed—
is higher for the criminal firm. Intuition along these lines was suggested by Stone (1980),
Kraakman (1984), and Privileggi, et al. (2001).
Proposition 2 shows that this intuition is incorrect. While targeting the employee and
banning his indemnification increases the burden of a given sanction on a guilty firm, it
increases the burden on a law-abiding firm even more than would simply increasing sanc-
tions against the firm. As a result, targeting the employee and banning his indemnification
is typically socially inefficient.
Proposition 2. Consider any crime-deterring sanction scheme that (a) has a positive
employee sanction (se > 0), (b) bans indemnification, (si = 0) and (c) does not force the
employee’s limited-liability constraint to bind along the equilibrium path (se ≤ e+w∗(0)).
Social welfare can be strictly increased by replacing this scheme with another that does
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not target the employee with sanctions (se = 0).
Proposition 2 follows from employee risk aversion. Banning indemnification prevents
the firm from insuring the employee against type-I enforcement error. Since the employee
is risk averse, such insurance would be socially valuable. Crime can be deterred more
efficiently if the firm alone were sanctioned because firm sanctions are just a transfer
between the firm and government involving no loss of social surplus.
Proposition 2 considers the case in which indemnification is banned. If indemnification
is allowed, employee sanctions are not necessarily inefficient. Given the firm has unlimited
liability, if the employee’s limited-liability constraint does not bind and indemnification
were allowed, employee sanctions would be equivalent to firm sanctions. Employee
sanctions would be fully passed through to the firm. Employee sanctions only become
inefficient if indemnification is banned as assumed in the conditions of Proposition 2.
4.2. True Benefit of Employee Sanctions
Proposition 2 leaves open a possible circumstance under which targeting the employee
may be beneficial: if the employee sanction se is so high that it forces his limited-liability
constraint to bind.
An effective deterrence scheme should harm a guilty firm more than an innocent one.
First, obviously, crime can only be deterred if the criminal firm’s surplus is reduced below
that from innocent behavior. Second, conditional on deterring crime, the government
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prefers a scheme that harms law-abiding firms as little as possible. Unfortunately, harm
to law-abiding firms cannot be avoided entirely because of type-I enforcement errors.
Proposition 3 shows that an employee sanction can be a useful deterrence tool if set so
high that his limited-liability constraint binds. Such a high employee sanction will result
in the seizure of all of the employee’s assets if there is a corporate-crime conviction. Since
the employee of a criminal firm must be paid a higher wage to induce him to commit the
crime, he has more assets to seize if a crime is committed than not, and so the employee
sanction harms the firm relatively more if a crime is committed. Though the nominal
employee sanction may be the same, the effective employee sanction is higher if a crime
is committed than if not.
While the statement of Proposition 3 focuses on the possibility that employee sanctions
are socially optimal, the proof is more comprehensive, fully characterizing the second-best
sanction scheme for all parameters. A by-product of this full characterization are necessary
and sufficient conditions for the case of interest in the statement of the proposition to arise.
The interested reader is referred to the appendix for the proof and this expanded set of
results.
Proposition 3. There exists a non-empty set of parameters for which the second-best
sanction scheme requires a positive employee sanction, se > 0. For all these parameters,
se bankrupts the employee, and thus must be set sufficiently high in the second best;
se = ∞ suffices.
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The high employee sanction in Proposition 3 is beneficial because it extracts more
from the employee of a criminal than an innocent firm. A similar benefit can be obtained
by conditioning the nominal fine on the employee’s income. Conard (1972) advocates
such a scheme, in particular advocating a cap on an employee’s liability equal to his
after-tax net income from the firm in the year of violation. In our model, if the fine were
set equal to this cap, the fine would also increase with the commission of a crime.
Employee sanctions generate a benefit in Proposition 3 whether or not indemnification
is banned by law. The employee sanction works by forcing the employee’s limited-liability
constraint to bind. If the employee’s limited-liability constraint binds anyway, the optimal
scheme may as well specify an unboundedly large employee sanction, in which case the
firm would prefer not to indemnify the employee whether or not indemnification is banned.
As yet, there is no public-policy rationale for banning indemnification. Such a rationale
will be provided in Section 5.
5. Banning Indemnification as a Prosecutorial Tool
We extend the model to allow prosecutors to seek the cooperation of the employee in
convicting the firm. We show that for some parameters, the optimal scheme bans indem-
nification in order to secure the employee’s cooperation with prosecutors, increasing the
probability the firm is convicted, and reducing the attractiveness of crime. This allows
the government to deter crime with lower fines. Lowering fines increases social welfare
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to the extent the fines can be reduced below the bankruptcy threshold, i.e., the threshold
above which a law-abiding firm is bankrupted when the government commits a type-I
enforcement error. Avoiding bankruptcy results in a savings of social welfare amounting
to the net value of the firm’s production.
5.1. Model Extension
Consider an extension of the model in which the government also has a prosecutorial
function. The prosecutors can use the cooperation of the employee to increase the prob-
ability the firm is convicted. We maintain the probabilities g0 and g1 but reinterpret
them as probabilities the government initiates an investigation of the crime rather than the
probability of conviction. Conditional on an investigation being initiated, the probability
of conviction is α ∈ (0, 1) if the employee does not cooperate with the prosecutors and
unity if he does.3 One can interpret cooperation by the employee as revealing a piece of
hard information proving the crime, a “smoking gun.” Consistent with this interpretation,
the employee can only cooperate if a crime has actually been committed; if the govern-
ment has committed a type-I enforcement error by investigating an innocent firm, it is
impossible for the employee to increase the probability of conviction by cooperating since
there is no “smoking gun” to reveal. Combining the probability of investigation with
the probability of conviction conditional on investigation, the unconditional probability
of conviction equals (in increasing order) αg0 if no crime was committed, αg1 if a crime
was committed and the employee does not cooperate with prosecutors, and g1 if a crime
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was committed and the employee cooperates with prosecutors.
5.2. Optimal Sanctions
Prosecutors induce the employee to cooperate by promising to forgive a portion of the
sanction in return for cooperation. Let sc ∈ [0, se] be the amount of the sanction forgiven.
If the firm fully indemnifies the employee, by setting si = se − sc, the prosecutors’
strategy will not work since the employee will not care about reducing the sanction.4 The
government thus needs to ban full indemnification to induce the employee to cooperate.
There are two ways for the government to do this. One is simply to set the employee
sanction so high that the firm chooses not to indemnify the agent even if it were allowed
to. Setting a high employee sanction may be inefficient if this increases the wages a
law-abiding firm needs to pay so much that it shuts down in equilibrium. If the shutdown
of law-abiding firms is a concern, it can be efficient for the government to prohibit
indemnification directly.
The next proposition identifies different cases in which the second-best sanction
scheme secures the employee’s cooperation with prosecutors by offering to forgive some
of his sanction. The proof in the appendix provides closed-form solutions for second-best
sanctions for all parameters. As part of the specification of second-best sanctions, the
proof provides necessary and sufficient conditions for cases (a) and (b) in Proposition 4
to arise.
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Proposition 4. Consider the extended model in which the employee can cooperate with
prosecutors. There exist two different cases, each involving a non-empty set of parameters,
in which the second-best sanction scheme requires a positive employee sanction.
(a) For the first set of parameters, the first best can be approached in the limit as
 → 0 with a sanction scheme involving a small employee sanction se =  that is
completely forgiven in exchange for cooperation (sc = ).
(b) For a second set of parameters, social welfare in the second best is bounded
away from the first best. The second best is obtained by sanctioning the employee
with se high enough to bankrupt him. If he cooperates, some of se is forgiven, but
the residual se − sc is bounded above 0.
In both case (a) and (b), second-best sanctions deter crime without shutting down the firm
and induce the employee to cooperate with prosecution by offering to forgive some of the
sanction.
In case (a), the government can increase the probability of conviction with virtually
no deadweight loss by levying a vanishingly small employee sanction which it forgives if
the employee cooperates. Indemnification must be banned for the forgiveness strategy to
work. Otherwise, because the employee sanction is so small, it would be virtually costless
for the firm to indemnify the employee. If the employee is indemnified, he would not
gain from cooperation.
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The second best approaches but does not reach the first best in case (a). By assumption
the employee cannot cooperate if a crime was not committed, since there is no “smoking
gun” to offer. Thus, the employee of an innocent firm would face the full sanction. But
the only gap in social welfare between first and second best is the risk borne by the
employee because of the unindemnified sanction. The gap disappears as the sanction
becomes vanishingly small.
The second-best sanction scheme in (b) bankrupts the employee with a large sanction.
This large, unindemnified risk leads to a loss in social welfare that is bounded above
0. Out of equilibrium, if a crime is committed, just enough of the sanction is forgiven
to induce the employee to cooperate, but a finite sanction is left unforgiven to enhance
deterrence.
It is not necessary for the government to ban indemnification for the sanction scheme
in case (b) to work. The employee sanction is sufficiently high that the firm would not
choose to indemnify the employee fully even if it were allowed by law. Indemnification
must be banned for the sanction scheme in (a) to work. Indeed, case (a) is the only
case identified anywhere in the paper in which banning indemnification can be socially
beneficial.
5.3. Other Forms of Cooperation
Thus far in Section 5, cooperation has been interpreted as providing prosecutors with
additional evidence which increases the probability of conviction. The main result of the
17
section will continue to hold if we broaden the interpretation of cooperation. Rather than
the provision of new evidence, cooperation can be interpreted as a refusal to cover up
existing evidence that would increase the probability of conviction or provide a better idea
of the severity of the harm from the crime (and consequently the sanction if convicted).
A related interpretation, adapting an idea from Arlen (1994), is that cooperation relates to
the maintenance of monitoring systems that increase the chance of alerting the government
to the corporate crime.
If the firm is allowed to fully indemnify the employee, it can eliminate his incentive
to cooperate under any of these new interpretations. As in Section 5.2, the government
can encourage the employee’s cooperation under these new interpretations by banning
indemnification but then forgiving some of the employee’s sanction if he is found to have
cooperated. The only care that one needs to exercise when reinterpreting cooperation in
these new ways is to understand the additional information burden that is placed on the
government. While prosecutors may automatically be able to verify that an employee has
handed them new evidence in a case, they may have a harder time verifying that he has
not covered up information or has maintained a monitoring system, especially in a setting
in which type-I and type-II enforcement errors are being committed. Still, if prosecutors
are able to verify these additional dimensions of employee cooperation with prosecution,
this expands the circumstances under which banning indemnification becomes a useful
prosecutorial tool.
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6. Literature Review
To our knowledge, ours is the first formal analysis of the question of whether indem-
nification should be banned, contributing to the literature studying the optimal division
of corporate-crime sanctions between the principal and agent. See Mullin and Snyder
(2008) for a review. Much of this literature (e.g., Newman and Wright, 1990; Macey,
1991; Arlen, 1994; Chu and Qian, 1995; Davis, 1996; Arlen and Kraakman, 1997;
Shavell, 1997; Arlen, 1998; Garoupa, 2000) analyzes the case in which the firm’s agent
commits a corporate crime in his own, and against the firm’s, interest. In this setting,
it is natural that the agent should be sanctioned in the socially-optimal legal regime; the
interesting question is whether the principal should be as well. Drawing on the broader
literature on vicarious liability (e.g., Sykes, 1984; Shavell, 1987), the articles show that
sanctioning the firm increases deterrence if limits to the agent’s wealth prevent his paying
sanctions sufficient to deter the crime; targeting the firm is particularly effective if it can
monitor the agent’s actions better than can government authorities.
In our framework, the agent’s alleged conduct benefits the firm (at least in the ab-
sence of sanctions). This is the natural framework for studying our central issue—
indemnification—because a firm would presumably not choose to indemnify its agent
for crimes against itself. Our framework complements the existing corporate-crime liter-
ature because few other papers in the literature assume the crime benefits the firm. One
exception is Privileggi, et al. (2001). Our paper differs from theirs in many respects
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including that the level of the fine is exogenous in their model and can only be levied on
one party or the other, so joint firm-employee liability is not allowed. Indemnification is
also exogenously ruled out in their model, whereas it is the focus of our paper.
Kornhauser (1982), Segerson and Tietenberg (1992), and Polinsky and Shavell (1993)
consider the case of a corporate tort. The employee and perhaps the firm invest in care
to prevent an accident. The authors find that the government authority should target the
employee for sanctions when the government is better at monitoring care and/or when the
government is better at levying sanctions because of its ultimate threat of imprisonment.
Indemnification plays no role in these papers because the firm has no incentive to indem-
nify the agent in equilibrium. Indeed, Polinsky and Shavell (1993) demonstrate cases in
which the firm prefers higher employee sanctions than the government. Our model of
willful corporate crimes is quite different: indemnification reduces the cost of inducing
the employee to commit the crime and hampers the prosecutor’s ability to reduce the
employee’s sanction in return for his cooperation against the firm.
A number of the ideas formally developed here were first noted in law review arti-
cles by Stone (1980) and Kraakman (1984), including that type-I enforcement errors may
provide a rationale for allowing employee indemnification and that forbidding indemni-
fication can help secure the cooperation of employees in prosecuting the firm. These
papers do not have models, however; our contribution is to provide a formal economic
model and analysis. The formal analysis allows us to identify new reasons for targeting
the employee. For example, we show it can be efficient to bankrupt the agent with a large
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sanction since the burden of this sanction falls more heavily on criminal than law-abiding
firms. Some of the ideas in the law review articles do not withstand formal scrutiny.
For example, we show that enhanced deterrence is not a reason to advocate a ban on
indemnification because higher firm sanctions are a more efficient alternative.
Our result that forbidding indemnification helps secure the cooperation of the employee
to increase the chances of successful prosecution of the firm is reminiscent of the work
of Arlen (1994), Chu and Qian (1995), and Arlen and Kraakman (1997). They show
that partially forgiving firm sanctions can increase the firm’s incentive to monitor the
employee when such monitoring can increase the likelihood of uncovering criminal acts
by employees. In both our work and theirs, the analysis is somewhat delicate because it
is not obvious the “cooperating” party would want to trade off a lower sanction for an
increased chance of prosecution.5 In our work, the identity of the “cooperating” party is
the opposite of theirs, the employee rather than the firm. More importantly, our insight that
forbidding indemnification plays a key role in allowing the government to trade reduced
sanctions for cooperation did not appear in these previous papers.
We assume the firm has unlimited liability, thus abstracting from what Shavell (1986)
and later authors term the problem of a “judgment proof” firm. We do this for two
reasons. First, it is already well-understood from the literature on vicarious liability that
if the liability of one party in a principal-agent setting is limited, it may only be possible to
deter crime by also sanctioning the other party. Second, a model in which firm judgment-
proofness provides the rationale for sanctioning the agent is not a fertile one for studying
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indemnification. Since sanctions bankrupt a judgment-proof firm, it would not have the
funds to indemnify the agent whether or not allowed by law. So the government’s policy
toward indemnification would be irrelevant.
7. Conclusion
This paper has studied the private and social returns to indemnification when even law-
abiding firms may face the risk of mistaken prosecution. The broad lesson to be drawn
from the analysis is that authorities should be wary of sanctioning employees let alone
banning their indemnification. Typically, firm sanctions deter crime more efficiently than
unindemnifiable employee sanctions.
We uncovered only two circumstances under which the government should sanction
the employee in addition to the firm. For a limited set of parameters, the government
cannot deter crime using only a sanction against the firm without causing the shutdown
of innocent firms (and consequent loss of these firms’ socially valuable production). For
a subset of these parameters, an employee sanction can help. The government can target
the employee with a sanction high enough to bankrupt him. This sanction falls relatively
harder on guilty than innocent firms because the employee must receive a higher wage to
induce him to commit a crime, leaving him with more assets to be seized in bankruptcy.
The government need not ban indemnification for this sanction scheme to work. The
employee sanction can be set so high that the firm would prefer not to indemnify him
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even if allowed by law.
Indeed, the basic model analyzed in Sections 2–4 does not provide any rationale for the
government to ban indemnification. To provide such a rationale, we extended the model
in Section 5 to allow the probability of conviction to increase if the employee cooperates
with prosecutors. In this extension, we found a limited set of parameters for which the
socially optimal sanction scheme involved a small employee sanction which is forgiven
if the employee cooperates with with prosecutors. The firm would have an incentive to
fully indemnify the employee to induce him not to cooperate, so indemnification must be
banned for this sanction strategy to work.
For the broad set of remaining parameters, as proved in Proposition 2, targeting the
employee and banning his indemnification is socially harmful. Indemnification reduces
the deadweight loss from the mistaken conviction of innocent firms by allowing the risk-
neutral firm an inexpensive way to insure the risk-averse employee against such errors.
Our assumption that the agent is risk averse implicitly focused our analysis on indemni-
fication of individuals (directors, officers, and other employees) within the firm. This is
the leading case in policy debates concerning indemnification. Another interesting case,
however, regards agency relationships a potentially criminal corporation may have with
other large, presumably risk-neutral, firms, for example, its input suppliers, investment
bank, accounting firm, law firm, or insurance company, termed “gatekeepers” by Kraak-
man (1986). Since indemnification has little if any insurance value for such agents, the
argument against banning their indemnification is weakened.
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Although the government was an imperfect enforcer in our model, it was still assumed
to be benevolent. In future work, it would be useful to analyze an alternative model in
which the legal action is brought by a non-benevolent party, whether a government with
objectives other than welfare maximization or a private party with the opportunity to bring
a nuisance suit. The social benefit of indemnification would presumably be greater in this
alternative model, and the case against banning indemnification presumably stronger.
Another avenue for future work is to depart from the simplifying assumption that the
principal is a unitary actor, breaking open the black box of the firm in various dimensions.
In our model, the firm for indemnifies the employee directly itself, whereas in practice
indemnification is often provided by third-party directors and officers (D&O) insurance.
It would be useful to understand the equilibrium effects of moving from self to third-
party indemnification. One possibility, following Holderness (1990), is that the third
party functions as an additional monitor to ensure the indemnification payouts are only
for acts taken in good faith. The black box of the firm can also be expanded by studying
possible conflicts between shareholders and directors. Directors, who have more direct
control over compensation and benefits packages, may protect themselves with stronger
indemnification policies or more D&O insurance than shareholders would prefer. Similar
agency conflicts could arise for employees that as officers in the firm can influence their
own compensation packages (see Kuhnen and Zwiebel, 2007). Accounting for these
additional sources of principal-agent conflicts within the black box of the firm might
change the calculus of optimal public policy toward indemnification.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Some new notation will help streamline the proofs. Let b(g, c),
a mnemonic for “bankruptcy wage,” be the wage that allows the employee to achieve
his reservation utility u(e) given that he exerts on-the-job effort c and given that a
government sanction sufficient to bankrupt him is levied with probability g. Formally,
b(g, c) implicitly solves
(1− g)u(e + b)− c = u(e),
or, rearranging,
b(g, c) = u−1
(
u(e) + c
1− g
)
− e.
To keep the notation concise, the dependence of b(g, c) on e is suppressed.
The profit-maximizing contract implementing action a is the wage w(a) and indem-
nification payment si maximizing
r(a)− w(a)− g(a)(sf + si) (A1)
subject to w(a) ≥ 0, si ≥ 0, and individual-rationality constraint
g(a)u(max{0, e + w(a) + si − se}) + [1− g(a)] u(e + w(a))− c(a) ≥ u(e). (A2)
It is obvious that (A2) binds. The non-differentiable max operator can be removed from
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(A2) by noting it is equivalent to the following set of constraints. Either both (A3) and
(A4) hold:
se ≥ e + w(a) + si (A3)
[1− g(a)] u(e + w(a))− c(a) = u(e); (A4)
or both (A5) and (A6) hold:
se ≤ e + w(a) + si (A5)
g(a)u(e + w(a) + si − se) + [1− g(a)] u(e + w(a))− c(a) = u(e). (A6)
We will solve two separate constrained optimization problems for these two sets of con-
straints and compare the solutions.
To proceed, first consider the problem of maximizing (A1) subject to w(a) ≥ 0,
si ≥ 0, (A3), and (A4). Put (A3) aside for now; we will return to this detail at the end of
the proof. The solution obviously involves setting si = 0 since si does not appear in (A4)
and (A1) is decreasing in si. Solving (A4) yields equilibrium wage w(a) = b(g(a), c(a)).
Next, consider the problem of maximizing (A1) subject to w(a) ≥ 0, si ≥ 0, (A5), and
(A6). Ignoring all constraints except (A6) yields the Lagrangian for equality-constrained
optimization:
L = r(a)− w(a)− g(a)(sf + si) + λ{g(a)u(e + w(a) + si − se)
+ [1− g(a)] u(e + w(a))− c(a)− u(e)} (A7)
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The first-order conditions with respect to w(a) and si upon rearranging are
1/λ = g(a)u′(e + w(a) + si − se) + [1− g(a)] u′(e + w(a)) (A8)
1/λ = u′(e + w(a) + si − se). (A9)
Setting the right-hand sides of (A8) and (A9) equal yields si = se. Substituting si = se
into (A6) yields the equilibrium wage w(a) = b(0, c(a)). It is easy to check that this
solution satisfies the ignored constraints.
Next, we need to compare the two solutions. The firm will select the solution gener-
ating the highest value of the objective (A1) or equivalently the solution minimizing the
total expected payment to the employee w(a) + g(a)si. The first solution yields expected
payment b(g(a), c(a)). The second yields expected payment b(0, c(a))+ g(a)se. The first
expected payment is lower, and thus the firm prefers the solution, if
se >
b(g(a), c(a))− b(0, c(a))
g(a)
. (A10)
A minor technical point remaining to be addressed is to verify that we were safe in
ignoring constraint (A3) in the first maximization problem. We will do so by showing
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that (A10) implies (A3). As a preliminary step, note
u−1(u(e) + c(a)) = u−1
(
g(a)(0) + [1− g(a)]
[
u(e) + c(a)
1− g(a)
])
(A11)
≤ g(a)u−1(0) + [1− g(a)]u−1
(
u(e) + c(a)
1− g(a)
)
(A12)
= [1− g(a)] u−1
(
u(e) + c(a)
1− g(a)
)
. (A13)
Inequality (A12) follows frm the concavity of u, which implies the convexity of u−1.
Equation (A13) follows from the assumption u(0) = 0, which implies u−1(0) = 0. The
right-hand side of (A10) is, after substituting the definition of b,
1
g(a)
[
u−1
(
u(e) + c(a)
1− g(a)
)
− u−1(u(e) + c(a))
]
≥ u−1
(
u(e) + c(a)
1− g(a)
)
, (A14)
where the inequality in (A14) follows from (A11) through (A13). But the right-hand side
of (A14) equals the right-hand side of (A3) after substituting the solution si = 0 and
w(a) = b(g(a), c(a)). and then substituting the definition of b. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose the government bans indemnification. Suppose fur-
ther that it imposes sanction scheme (sf , se) with se > 0 such that, in the continuation
equilibrium, (a) crime is deterred and (b) the employee’s limited-liability constraint does
not bind. We will show that social surplus can be increased by moving to a new sanction
scheme with no employee sanction.
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Let y(a, se) denote the wage that is optimal for the firm to pay given it wants to
implement action a and given the employee’s sanction is se, which the firm is banned
from indemnifying. As indicated in the proof of Proposition 1, the employee’s individual-
rationality constraint binds at an optimum. Substituting the indemnification-ban condition
si = 0 into equation (A2) and imposing the assumption that employee limited liability
does not bind in equilibrium, we have that y(a, se) is the implicit solution to
g(a)u(e + y(a, se)− se) + [1− g(a)]u(e + y(a, se))− c(a) = u(e). (A15)
Since c(0) = 0, equation (A15) implies y(0, 0) = 0.
Expected social surplus under the original sanction scheme (sf , se) equals expected
firm profit R−y(0, se)−g0sf plus employee surplus u(e) (this simple expression follows
because employee individual rationality is binding) plus expected government sanction
revenue g0(sf + se), or, rearranging,
R− y(0, se) + u(e) + g0se. (A16)
For the new sanction scheme (s′f , s′e) to deter crime, the firm’s profit from no crime
R−y(0, 0)−g0s′f = R−g0s′f must weakly exceed its profit from crime R+X−y(1, 0)−
g1s
′
f , or, rearranging,
s′f ≥
X − y(1, 0)
g1 − g0 . (A17)
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Without loss of generality, we will take the value of s′f such that (A17) holds with equality.
Social surplus under the new scheme equals the sum of firm profit R − g0s′f plus
employee surplus u(e) (again, employee indvidual rationality binds) plus expected gov-
ernment sanction revenue g0s′f , or, rearranging,
R + u(e). (A18)
Expected social surplus is higher under the new sanction scheme if and only if (A18)
exceeds (A16) or equivalently if and only if g0se < y(0, se).
We will show this last inequality follows from the concavity of u. By definition of
concavity,
tu(x′) + (1− t)u(x′′) < u(tx′ + (1− t)x′′) (A19)
for t ∈ [0, 1]. Substituting t = g0, x′ = e − (1− g0)se, and x′′ = e + g0se into (A19)
yields
g0u(e + g0se − se) + (1− g0)u(e + g0se) < u(e). (A20)
Substituting a = 0 into (A15) implies
g0u(e + y(0, se)− se) + (1− g0)u(e + y(0, se))− c(a) = u(e). (A21)
Since u′ > 0, (A20) and (A21) together imply g0se < y(0, se) and thus that expected
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social welfare increases by moving to the sanction scheme with no employee sanction.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: In this proof we will solve for the second-best sanction scheme
for arbitrary parameters. At the end we will show how the statement of Proposition 3 can
be gleaned from these general results. The following expressions will help partition the
characterization of the optimal scheme into subcases:
b(0, C) +
[
g1 − g0
g0
]
R −X (A22)
H −R −X + b(0, C) (A23)
X −
[
g1 − g0
g0
]
R +
(
g1
g0
)
b(g0, 0)− b(g1, C) (A24)
X −H + b(g0, 0)− b(0, C). (A25)
By Proposition 2, without loss of generality, the socially optimal employee sanction
can be taken to be either zero or so high it forces the employee’s limited-liability constraint
to bind in equilibrium. In the latter event, without loss of generality, the socially optimal
employee sanction can be taken to be se = ∞. The proof proceeds by analyzing the
se = 0 and se = ∞ cases separately in two steps and then combining and extending the
results in a final step.
Step 1: Compute the socially optimal sanction scheme constraining se = 0. We first
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compute the firm’s maximum profit as a function of sf for each action a the firm can
induce. Suppose the firm decides to induce a = 0. Then applying Proposition 1 with
a = 0 and se = 0, we have that the firm optimally pays the employee wage b(0, 0) = 0.
Consequently, the firm’s maximum profit is
R− g0sf . (A26)
Suppose the firm decides to induce a = 1. Then applying Proposition 1 with a = 1 and
se = 0, we have that the firm optimally pays the employee wage b(0, C). Consequently,
the firm’s maximum profit is
R + X − b(0, C)− g1sf . (A27)
Because firm sanctions are frictionless transfers, social welfare is independent of sf
except to the extent that sf affects action a. Because (A26) and (A27) are linear in sf , the
socially optimal firm sanction can be taken, without loss of generality, to be one corner,
sf = 0, the other corner, sf = ∞, or the value at which the law-abiding firm is just
indifferent between shutting down and not, sf = R/g0. If (A22) is positive, substituting
sf = R/g0 implies (A26) is both nonnegative and greater than (A27). Thus, the sanction
scheme (sf , se) = (R/g0, 0) deters crime with no deadweight loss.
On the other hand, if (A22) is negative, deterring crime involves a deadweight loss.
32
Among schemes with se = 0, the two possibilities are that crime is not deterred or that
crime is deterred by shutting down the firm. (Among schemes with se > 0, it is possible
that crime is deterred without shutting down the firm, but there is still a deadweight
loss because the employee will bear some risk. This last possibility is discussed in
step 3.) If (A23) is positive, the social surplus from setting sf =∞ and thereby shutting
down the firm, u(e), exceeds that from setting sf = 0 and thereby allowing crime,
R + X −H − b(0, C) + u(e).
Step 2: Compute the socially optimal sanction scheme constraining se = ∞. Through-
out this step, maintain the assumption that (A22) is negative. In step 1, we already found
the first best scheme if (A22) is positive. As in step 1, we begin by computing the firm’s
maximum profits as functions of sf for each action a it can induce. Suppose the firm
decides to induce a = 0. Then applying Proposition 1 with a = 0 and se = ∞, we have
that the firm optimally pays the employee wage b(g0, 0) Consequently, maximum firm
profit is
R − b(g0, 0) − g0sf . (A28)
Suppose the firm decides to induce a = 1. Then applying Proposition 1 with a = 1 and
se = ∞, we have that the firm optimally pays the employee wage b(g1, C). Consequently,
maximum firm profit is
R + X − b(g1, C)− g1sf . (A29)
By similar logic to that in step 1, the socially optimal firm sanction can be taken,
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without loss of generality, to be one corner, sf = 0, the other corner, sf = ∞, or the
value at which the law-abiding firm is just indifferent between shutting down and not:
sf =
R − b(g0, 0)
g0
(A30)
If (A24) is positive, even if sf is set to the value in (A30), (A29) exceeds (A28), implying
that the value of sf in (A30) cannot deter crime; hence, the optimal firm sanction is either
sf = ∞ (if, as shown in step 1, (A23) is positive) or sf = 0 (if, as shown in step 1,
(A23) is negative). If (A24) is negative, setting sf to the value in (A30) is sufficient to
deter crime without shutting the firm down; hence, sf = ∞ is suboptimal.
Step 3: Comparison and extension. The preceding steps provide a complete charac-
terization of the socially-optimal sanction scheme in all but one subcase. If (A22) and
(A24) are negative, we showed sf = se = ∞ is suboptimal. Thus, the optimal scheme
must either involve sf = se = 0 and allow crime or involve sf equal to the value in
(A30) and se = ∞ and deter crime as efficiently as possible. (It is impossible to deter
crime with se = 0 because this would lead to the first best, contradicting the previous
finding that the first best cannot be obtained if (A22) is negative.) If (A25) is positive,
the scheme that allows crime generates higher social welfare and if (A25) is negative, the
reverse is true.
Synthesizing the analysis, we have the following four cases. To make the statements
of the conditions more elegant, ignore knife-edge cases in which conditions (A22) through
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(A25) exactly equal zero.
• If (A22) is positive, then the government can obtain the first best, deterring corporate
crime with no deadweight loss, with a sanction scheme that does not target the
employee. In particular, the scheme sf = R/g0 and se = 0 suffices.
• If (A22) is negative and (A23) and (A24) are positive, then the socially optimal
sanction scheme deters crime by shutting down the firm. In particular, the scheme
sf = ∞ and se = 0 suffices.
• If (A22) and (A23) are negative and (A25) is positive, then the socially optimal
sanction scheme does not deter crime. In particular, the scheme sf = se = 0
suffices.
• For the remaining cases in which expressions (A22) through (A25) are nonzero,
the socially optimal sanction scheme, which deters crime and does not lead to the
shutdown of the firm, must involve a positive employee sanction. In particular, the
scheme in which sf equals (A30) and se = ∞ suffices.
This completes the full characterization of the optimal sanction scheme and continuation
equilibrium for all parameters. The last bullet point provides necessary and sufficient
conditions for case of interest in the statement of the proposition, viz., the case in which
the optimal sanction scheme requires se > 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: Consider the extended model in which the employee can in-
crease the probability of conviction by cooperating with prosecutors. In addition to (A22)
and (A23), the following expressions will help partition subcases in our characterization
of the socially optimal sanction scheme:
b(0, C) +
[
g1 − αg0
αg0
]
R −X (A31)
X −
[
g1 − αg0
αg0
]
R +
g1
αg0
b(αg0, 0)− b(αg1, C) (A32)
X −H + b(αg1, C)− b(0, C). (A33)
Following the calculations in the proof of Proposition 3, it can be verified that the
first best can be obtained if (A22) is positive, using the same scheme as in the proof of
Proposition 3. If (A22) is negative and (A31) is positive, the first best can be approached
arbitrarily closely using the scheme in case (b) of Proposition 4. Arguments analogous
to those in the proof of Proposition 2 can be used to show that if the firm operates and
crime is deterred, an interior value of se is suboptimal. Thus, if the firm operates and
crime is deterred, the sanction scheme must either set an arbitrarily small value of se or
value large enough to force the employee’s limited-liability constraint to bind.
Therefore, if (A22) and (A31) are negative, we are left with three strategies for the
optimal sanction scheme. The scheme either shuts the firm down, allows crime, or deters
crime without shutting the firm down by forcing the employee’s limited-liability constraint
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to bind. We computed the maximum social surplus from the first two strategies in the
proof of Proposition 3. It remains to compute the social surplus from the optimal scheme
using the third strategy.
We first compute the firm’s maximum profit from the third strategy if no crime is
induced. In this situation, the probability of conviction is αg0. The firm optimally pays
a wage forcing employee individual rationality to bind. Given se bankrupts the employee
by assumption, this wage is b(αg0, 0). Thus the firm’s profit is
R− b(αg0, 0) − αg0sf . (A34)
Next, we compute the firm’s maximum profit if a crime is induced. The firm’s
profit depends on whether or not the employee cooperates with prosecutors. The socially
optimal sanction scheme obviously induces cooperation. We need to see what this implies
for the employee’s compensation and the structure of the optimal sanction scheme. If the
employee cooperates, he earns
g1u(e − se + sc + w∗) + (1− g1)u(e + w∗)−C, (A35)
where w∗ is the equilibrium wage for which we will shortly solve. If he does not cooperate,
he earns
αg1u(0) + (1− αg1)u(e + w∗)− C (A36)
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since se forces the employee’s limited-liability constraint to bind, so that all the employee’s
assets are seized if there is a conviction. The optimal value of sc forces (A35) to equal
(A36), implying
sc = se −w∗ − e + u−1((1− α)u(e + w∗)),
in turn implying the employee’s surplus from cooperating is
(1− αg1)u(e + w∗) −C (A37)
since u(0) = 0. The employee cooperates in equilibrium, so (A37) characterizes the em-
ployee’s equilibrium surplus. The firm optimally pays w∗ forcing the employee individual
rationality to bind or, equivalently, forcing (A37) to equal u(e), implying w∗ = b(αg1, C).
Firm profit if it induces crime is thus
R + X − b(αg1, C)− g1sf . (A38)
It is feasible for the sanction scheme considered above to deter crime if (A38) is
negative when evaluated at the highest value of sf for which (A34) is nonnegative.
Expression (A34) equals zero for the value of sf in part (b) of the statement of the
proposition. Substituting into (A38) and rearranging, (A38) is negative if (A32) is positive.
If it is feasible for this scheme to deter crime, this scheme generates higher social surplus
than shutting the firm down. Straightforward calculations show that this scheme generates
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higher social surplus than allowing crime if (A33) is negative.
Our usual specification of a high employee sanction, i.e., se = ∞, will not work
here since forgiving a finite amount from an infinite sanction leaves an infinite sanction.
Instead, we will set se to a finite number M that is large enough that the firm chooses
not to indemnify the employee even if allowed by law. For example, it suffices to set
M = R + X.
The proof is concluded by providing a synthesis of the preceding results into a complete
characterization of the socially optimal sanction scheme There are five exhaustive cases.
• If (A22) is positive, then the government can obtain the first best, deterring corporate
crime with no deadweight loss, with a sanction scheme that does not target the
employee and does not seek employee cooperation with prosecutors. In particular,
the scheme sf = R/g0 and se = sc = 0 suffices.
• If (A22) is negative and (A31) is positive, a socially optimal sanction scheme does
not exist because of an “open set” problem, but the first best can be approached
arbitrarily closely in the limit as  → 0 with sanctions sf = (R − )/αg0 and
sc = se = .
• If (A22) and (A31) are negative and (A23) and (A32) are positive, then the socially
optimal sanction scheme deters crime by shutting down the firm. In particular, the
scheme sf = ∞ and se = sc = 0 suffices.
• If (A22), (A23), and (A31) are negative and (A33) is positive, then the socially
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optimal sanction scheme does not deter crime. In particular, the scheme sf = se =
sc = 0 suffices.
• For the remaining cases in which (A22), (A23), (A31), (A32), and (A33) are
nonzero, the following sanction scheme obtains the second best:
sf =
1
αg0
[
R − u−1
(
u(e)
1− αg0
)
+ e
]
, (A39)
sc = M − u−1
(
u(e) + C
1− αg1
)
+ u−1
(
(1− α)[u(e) + C ]
1− αg1
)
, (A40)
and se = M , where M is a sufficiently large number (e.g., M = R + X suffices).
Q.E.D.
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